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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
suitors in negligent treatment and negligent medication cases because
of the greater danger of specious claims.40
ARTICLE 3 -JURISDITION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii): Case illustrates factors to be considered when de-
termining whether a defendant has derived "substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce."
CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) extends jurisdiction of New York courts to en-
compass a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act without the state
causing injury within the state and who "expects or should reasonably
expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce." Since foreseeabil-
ity of New York consequences is undeniable in many instances, the op-
eration of this subsection might expose a nondomiciliary to an unfair
burden of defending an action here were it not for the additional caveat
that the tortfeasor derive substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce. 41
To date, the phrase "substantial revenue" has escaped precise def-
inition. Given the rationale underlying CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii),42 it would
seem that this state of uncertainty is preferable to a condition of certi-
tude resulting from the establishment of arbitrary dollar volume or per-
centage of interstate income criteria.43 Indeed, in Path Instruments
International Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co.44 a federal district court dem-
onstrated the necessity of looking beyond the unadorned income quotas
to discern the existence of substantial revenue.
40 Cf. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); see also Rapson, "To Guard Against The Unfounded Actions.
The Issue Behind The Mendel Labels, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 96 (1970).
41 To illustrate the hardship that would be visited upon a nondomiciliary absent the
"substantial revenue" requirement, consider the following question posed by Professor
McLaughlin:
Suppose a California tire dealer sold and installed a set of tires on an automobile
belonging to a tourist with New York license plates. Presumably, the plates would
make it foreseeable that the automobile would eventually return to New York,
and that if the tires should fail, an injury would occur in New York. Would it
be reasonable to require the tire dealer to defend the action in New York?
7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary at 132 (1966); see also Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
42 CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is premised on the relationship between income derived in inter-
state and international commerce and the ability to handle litigation away from the pri-
mary business location. 1 WK&M 302.10a.
4 3 See, e.g., Gluck v. Fasig Tipton Co., 63 Misc. 2d 82, 310 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 342, 348 (1970);
cf. Gillmore v. J.S. Inskip, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 218, 282 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1967).
44 312 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Plaintiff, a New York corporation, brought suit against Asahi Op-
tical Co., Hughes-Owens Co. (Canada), and Hughes-Owens Co. (Ill-
inois) alleging a conspiracy to injure its business. 45 The court experi-
enced little difficulty in justifying the assumption of jurisdiction over
Asahi Optical Co. and Hughes-Owens Co. (Canada),46 but with respect
to Hughes-Owens Co. (Illinois) the jurisdictional nexus was not so
readily perceivable. First of all, the court regarded the company's inter-
state income of $85,000 as insufficient in absolute terms to meet the
requirements of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). Secondly, even the fact that the
company's business was almost exclusively interstate in character was
viewed guardedly by the court. Nevertheless, the company's interstate
activities were deemed to evidence substantial revenue when coupled
with the recognition that the company had functioned as the sales and
distributional arm of a much larger organization, Hughes-Owens Co.
(Canada).47
Perhaps, no one case can ever completely define "substantial reve-
nue" inasmuch as most of the cases arising under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) are
sui generis. Nonetheless, Path Instruments offers a reasonable approach
to jurisdictional questions in this area. It seems clear that the "dollar vol-
ume" and "percentage of income" tests should not be employed either
alternatively or in the abstract. For, a defendant whose 80 percent inter-
state income amounts to $10,000 should not be subjected to suit in New
York. Conversely, the defendant whose 10 percent interstate income
totals $100,000 can certainly bear the expense of out-of-state litigation.
Where, as in Path Instruments, neither test yields a satisfactory result,
an examination of the circumstances surrounding the operation of de-
fendant's business can facilitate a just outcome.
45 The court ruled initially that the alleged conspiracy constituted a tortious act even
though the means alleged was a breach of contract. Id. at 808, citing Avon Prods., Inc. v.
Berson, 206 Misc. 900, 135 N.Y.S.2d 867 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
46 Asahi is a large manufacturer of optical devices and instruments and as an example
of the magnitude of its international business, the court pointed to a contract with Path
providing that Path would purchase a minimum of $300,000 in surveying equipment from
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Asahi in 1967. As to Hughes-Owens (Canada) its 1968 gross
sales revenue of $7,686,817 was derived from the distribution and sale of inventory pur-
chased from about 1,200 manufacturers and suppliers throughout the world. The court
was therefore prompted to hold "both Asahi and Hughes-Owens (Canada) are sizeable
corporations already engaged in transaction of substantial international business, for whom
the expense and complexity of defending a lawsuit in the courts of New York will not be
an unreasonable inconvenience." 312 F. Supp. at 809.
47 Perhaps, many courts would not have been compelled to look behind the defen-
dant's gross sales figure and the percentage of interstate income in relation to total income.
Judge Mansfield, however, the author of Path Instruments, has previously questioned the
constitutionality of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii). See Chunky v. Blumenthal Bros. Chocolate Co.,
299 F. Supp. 110, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 532, 543 (1970).
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